VMware Security Advisory 2011-0003 - Update 1 for vCenter Server 4.1, vCenter Update Manager 4.1, vSphere Hypervisor (ESXi) 4.1, ESXi 4.1, addresses several security issues.
a95e2afdac2f371dde546f60106ef87c8a8060a48b0bed878681c1eba5041ffe
This Metasploit module exploit smashes several pointers. A heap-based buffer overflow can occur when calling the undocumented "sp_replwritetovarbin" extended stored procedure. This vulnerability affects all versions of Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and 2005, Windows Internal Database, and Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) without the updates supplied in MS09-004. Microsoft patched this vulnerability in SP3 for 2005 without any public mention.
22edb58a5f3eb94beb9d96ca4c1c67aaf6a45c0df8336fcfd1b91c3de3a418ba
A heap-based buffer overflow can occur when calling the undocumented "sp_replwritetovarbin" extended stored procedure. This vulnerability affects all versions of Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and 2005, Windows Internal Database, and Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) without the updates supplied in MS09-004. This exploit smashes several pointers, as shown below. 1. pointer to a 32-bit value that is set to 0 2. pointer to a 32-bit value that is set to a length influenced by the buffer length. 3. pointer to a 32-bit value that is used as a vtable pointer. In MSSQL 2000, this value is referenced with a displacement of 0x38. For MSSQL 2005, the displacement is 0x10. The address of our buffer is conveniently stored in ecx when this instruction is executed. 4. On MSSQL 2005, an additional vtable ptr is smashed, which is referenced with a displacement of 4. This pointer is not used by this exploit. There are two different methods used by this exploit, which have been named "writeNcall" and "sprayNbrute". The first, "writeNcall", was published by k'sOSe on Dec 17 2008. It uses pointers 2 and 3, as well as a writeable address. This method is quite reliable. However, it relies on the the operation on pointer 2. Newer versions of SQL server (>= 2000 SP3 at least) use a length value that is 8-byte aligned. This imposes a restriction that the code address that leads to the payload (jmp ecx in this case) must match the regex '.[08].[08].[08].[08]'. Unfortunately, no such addresses were found in memory. For this reason, the second method, "sprayNbrute" is used. First a heap-spray is used to prime memory with lots of copies of the address of our code that leads to the payload (jmp ecx). Next, brute force is used to try to guess a value for pointer 3 that points to the sprayed data. A new method of spraying the heap inside MSSQL is presented. Sadly, it only allows the creation of a bunch of 8000 byte buffers.
132206feb12275d819fe75a51931368d87b85cda3a85d8d40fc77ff46d0342f7